The Decline in Value Formulation: How Courts Should Approach State Bulk Sale Provisions in Bankruptcy by Check, Anthony
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
Volume 36 
Issue 1 A Tribute to James H.M. Sprayregen 
2020 
The Decline in Value Formulation: How Courts Should Approach 
State Bulk Sale Provisions in Bankruptcy 
Anthony Check 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony Check, The Decline in Value Formulation: How Courts Should Approach State Bulk Sale 
Provisions in Bankruptcy, 36 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 259 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol36/iss1/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
CHECKPROOFS_4.30.20 5/3/2020 4:44 PM 
 
THE DECLINE IN VALUE FORMULATION: HOW COURTS 
SHOULD APPROACH STATE BULK SALE PROVISIONS 
IN BANKRUPTCY 
ABSTRACT 
Bulk sale provisions give state departments a unique power that 
distinguishes them from the traditional creditor. In light of the special nature of 
the interests derived from bulk sale provisions, courts should recognize such 
interests to be protectable by § 363(e), even if traditional bankruptcy procedures 
would value that interest at $0. In lieu of blindly protecting the interests of state 
departments or senior creditors, courts should meet somewhere closer in the 
middle of each party’s interests. In reaching this middle ground, to assess the 
degree to which this protection should extend, the burden should be on the state 
department to prove that the stripping away of its interest resulted in that 
interest declining in value. To prove such a fact, a state department must show 
that it would have recovered value from its interest, notwithstanding the fact that 
the interest was stripped away. Courts should place a value on such an interest 
that is commensurate to the decline in value of that interest, provided the state 
department has proven the decline in value. The recognition of such an interest 
as protectable serves to avoid litigation about how courts should recognize such 
an interest. Furthermore, it will allow parties to approach a bulk sale without 
having to worry about dealing with inconsistent courts that oftentimes unduly 
favor state departments over individual creditors, and vice-versa. By clearing 
up such confusion, buyers, sellers, creditors, and state departments will be more 
likely to negotiate with each other before the purchase occurs, allowing all 
parties to ensure their interests are well represented. Accordingly, courts should 
adopt a “decline in value” formulation, provided in dicta of Illinois Department 
of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, to determine what value to place on interests 
deriving from bulk sale provisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Illinois Department of Revenue v. 
Hanmi Bank has left many questions unanswered regarding how “bulk sale 
provisions” should be treated when exercised by state revenue departments.1 For 
the purposes of this Comment, bulk sale provisions are state statutes requiring 
the purchaser in a bulk sale to follow certain procedures aimed at protecting the 
ability of the state to collect unpaid taxes. Following this decision, it is prescient 
to explore whether bulk sale provisions create an interest in state revenue 
departments, and, if they do, how courts should classify and treat such interests. 
This question is important because how we classify bulk sale provisions affects 
not only the debtor and creditor-revenue departments, but also the non-revenue 
department creditors and potential purchasers. 
Historically, states instituted bulk sale provisions to protect against debtors 
liquidating a large portion of their inventory and absconding with the proceeds.2 
This was common in inventory transactions, in which a debtor would acquire all 
or most of inventory on credit.3 After the acquisition of this inventory, a debtor 
could simply sell off the inventory and leave the state.4 Typically, this occurred 
between small business and wholesale providers. Modern advances in credit 
reporting have greatly minimized this risk because wholesale providers now 
have much better means of assessing the credibility of an institution.5  
To supplement or replace state law, the original UCC Article 6 was enacted. 
This provided that buyers who were receiving assets in a bulk sale must contact 
the seller’s creditors and maintain a list of all creditors, as well as a schedule of 
property in the bulk sale.6 If the buyers did not comply with UCC Article 6, the 
creditors had the ability to void the sale.7 While only a model, the original UCC 
Article 6 was adopted by various states who desired to protect creditors from 
being spurned by duplicitous debtors who were commencing a bulk sale.8 
 
 1 See Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 6, PREFATORY NOTE. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Id.  
 8 Currently, seven states and territories have adopted UCC Article 6: Arizona, California, District of 
Columbia, Indiana, Georgia, Montana, and Nebraska. The majority of states have enacted different, albeit similar 
bulk sale provisions. AIRSLATE LEGAL FORMS, INC., States Adopting The UCC, U.S. LEGAL, https:// 
uniformcommercialcode.slegal.com/states-adopting-the-ucc/.  
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Because of advances in credit reporting, and a general disappearance of the 
original problem, the original UCC Article 6 was seen as overly burdensome on 
buyers.9 Thus, the revised UCC Article 6 was set forth. The revised version 
allows states two options. Option A allows states to repeal UCC Article 6.10 
Option B offers a revised and updated Article 6 to those states and jurisdictions 
that will evaluate the positions of creditors, sellers, and buyers, and then decide 
whether to retain a bulk sales law.11  
The initial aim of UCC Article 6 was to protect creditors. Many state bulk 
sale provisions have this aim in mind as well, but often with an emphasis on a 
narrower subset of creditors, i.e., creditors who owe back taxes to the state. 
These taxes may have resulted from a failure to pay taxes over time,12 however, 
it is often the case that the unpaid taxes stem from sales taxes that accompany 
the bulk sale itself. Typically, these bulk sale provisions apply when an entity 
sells or transfers a substantial portion of its business, outside of its normal 
business operations—thus the reasoning behind the name “bulk sale.”13  
The bulk sale statute relied upon in Hanmi is typical of many states’ bulk 
sale edicts, and dictates that a purchaser in a bulk sale must give notice of the 
purchase to the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR).14 From there, IDOR 
reserves the ability to issue a “stop order” commanding the purchaser to set aside 
an estimated portion of the purchase monies to cover any unpaid taxes owed by 
the seller to IDOR.15 IDOR then has sixty business days to determine the actual 
amount owed, and to issue a revised stop order compelling the purchaser to 
continue holding the set-aside purchase monies.16 Should the seller fail to pay 
the unpaid taxes, IDOR may issue a demand to the purchaser to turn over the 
set-aside funds.17 If the purchaser fails to provide notice, reserve the requisite 
funds, or turn over the reserved funds, IDOR has the ability to go after the 
purchaser personally.18  
 
 9 UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary (last visited Nov. 14, 2018). 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id.  
 12 These back taxes could be generated from property tax, income tax, etc. 
 13 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 
465, 474 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 14 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 474. 
 15 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 474. 
 16 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 474. 
 17 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 474. 
 18 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 474. 
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This relatively straightforward process becomes increasingly muddled when 
bulk sales are part of a bankruptcy proceeding. Because bulk sales carry the 
specter of 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) with them—providing that the bankruptcy trustee 
may sell property “free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity 
other than the estate” so long as certain factors are satisfied19—this strips away 
IDOR’s interest in the property (the ability to collect unpaid taxes), and the 
purchaser receives the property without having to worry about any liability due 
to IDOR.20 However, § 363(f) does not leave interest holders at a complete 
loss.21 Entities whose interests are stripped via § 363(f) may request adequate 
protection pursuant to § 363(e), which provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on 
request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, 
or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with 
or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease 
as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.22  
In other words, § 363(e) provides a mechanism by which an entity whose interest 
has diminished in value may be recompensed to the degree that interest 
decreased in value.23 Such compensation typically comes from the proceeds of 
the sale.24  
The instant issue arises because of the way in which courts apply § 363(e). 
It is customary for courts to grant adequate protection only to protect the relevant 
interest from a decline in value.25 The burden of showing that an interest has 
declined in value is on the interest holder.26 The bankruptcy court has the 
discretion to determine whether the interest holder has overcome this burden by 
proving that the interest has declined or is declining in value.27 The practical 
 
 19 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2019) (Factors include: “(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such 
property free and clear of such interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which 
such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) such interest is in 
bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money 
satisfaction of such interest.”).  
 20 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 467. 
 21 § 363(f); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 468.  
 22 § 363(e). 
 23 § 363(e); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465.  
 24 See, e.g., Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 467. 
 25 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 470; see also Zink v. Vanmiddlesworth, 300 B.R. 394, 401 (N.D.N.Y 
2003). 
 26 Zink, 300 B.R. at 401. 
 27 Id. (Adequate protection need not only follow from the use of § 363(f). Oftentimes, adequate protection 
is used to lift an automatic stay in a bankruptcy case in which a secured property is depreciating in value. The 
bankruptcy court has the discretion to lift the stay and order that the depreciating property be foreclosed on in 
order to liquidate the depreciating collateral).  
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effects of the “declining in value” formulation of § 363(e) are apparent when a 
creditor seeks to utilize § 363(e) in a bankruptcy proceeding in which junior 
creditors are set to receive nothing. For example, imagine a creditor (Creditor 
A) wishes to assert § 363(e) to protect its claim of $100,000 in a proceeding in 
which the assets of the estate amount to $500,000. Imagine further that a second 
creditor (Creditor B) has a secured claim of $1 million dollars. The bankruptcy 
trustee strips away Creditor A’s interest and pays the entirety of the estate to 
Creditor B. Creditor A then applies for adequate protection, arguing that its 
interest has diminished from $100,000 to $0. The bankruptcy court would 
assuredly deny Creditor A’s request, because its interest never actually 
diminished in value. Given that the estate was insolvent, and the entirety of the 
assets were owed to Creditor B whose claim had priority over Creditor A, 
Creditor A would have never received anything from the estate, regardless of 
whether its interest was stripped away pursuant to § 363(f). Thus, Creditor A’s 
interest was always worth $0, and therefore could not have diminished in value.  
The notion that adequate protection may only be granted when a creditor’s 
interest has diminished in value is a crucial step in understanding why state 
departments such as IDOR contend that their interests stemming from bulk sales 
should be viewed differently than, for example, the interest held by Creditor A. 
The distinguishing factor, as IDOR and other state departments contend, 
between a creditor like Creditor A, and a state department operating pursuant to 
a bulk sale provision, is that a state department’s interest diminishes in value the 
moment a state department can no longer seek payment through successor 
liability doctrine. Regardless of whether a state department would receive any 
value deriving from its claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, it would be able to 
seek the lost value from the purchaser, outside of bankruptcy, pursuant to the 
bulk sale provision. Accordingly, although the state department’s interest may 
be valued at $0 for purposes of the bankruptcy proceeding, the ability to pursue 
the purchaser is valuable, notwithstanding what its value is for purposes of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. By stripping away that ability via § 363(f), the 
bankruptcy proceeding results in the state department’s interest diminishing in 
value. 
Thus, state departments will likely contend that their interest is “special” in 
a sense, because, despite the fact that its interest did not decline in value within 
the administration of the estate,28 the ability to realize the interest outside of 
bankruptcy distinguishes the state department from other creditors. By taking 
 
 28 Their interest did not decline via the bankruptcy proceeding as they would have received $0 from the 
estate itself, regardless of whether the interest was stripped pursuant to § 363(f). 
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away the ability of a state department to pursue successor liability against a 
purchaser, the trustee has robbed the state of whatever value it would have 
derived from the purchaser. In other words, a state department will contend that 
its interest is “special” and thus should be afforded extra protection, because it 
need not rely on the assets of the bankruptcy estate to recoup the value of its 
claim.  
Given the interplay between §§ 363 (f) and (e), it is easy to understand the 
importance of determining whether bulk sale provisions create “special” 
interests in state revenue departments. If a bulk sale provision creates a “special” 
interest in the state revenue department, that interest can be protected pursuant 
to § 363(e), and the state revenue department can be remunerated for the loss of 
value in that interest stemming from the bulk sale.29 The recognition of an 
interest with the ability to circumvent the typical application of § 363(e), i.e., an 
interest that may still be adequately protected despite the fact that that interest 
did not diminish in value within the confines of a bankruptcy estate’s asset 
distribution, has profound effects on the administration of a bankruptcy estate 
experiencing a bulk sale, the most obvious effect being a tendency to lower the 
sale price, and ultimately, lower the return that other creditors will receive on 
their claims.  
This Comment intends to explore the ways in which purchasers and creditors 
(both regular creditors and state department creditors) should approach bulk 
sales, as well as provide reasons for why courts should recognize the special 
ability of a state department to utilize successor liability, while still adhering to 
an adequate protection framework that rests on a “decline in value” formulation 
that provides adequate protection to the extent that a state department shows that 
interest declined in value. In doing so, this Comment will compare two cases 
that grappled with how to handle bulk sale provisions—Illinois Department of 
Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, and Schnyder v. State Board of Equalization—to 
highlight the varying weights courts give to bulk sale provisions.30 From there, 
a discussion of policy concerns that shape how the courts should respond to the 
issue is examined. And finally, an exploration about how the relevant parties 
should approach a bulk sale, in order to best prepare for a bulk sale taking place 
during a bankruptcy. 
 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465. 
 30 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 468; Schnyder v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538, 542 (Cal 
Ct. App. 2012). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
At the heart of the issue of how to dealing with bulk sale provisions in a 
bankruptcy proceeding is the policy question of whom courts should offer more 
protection to—senior creditors or state departments? When it comes to this issue, 
the Courts in both Hanmi and Schnyder fall on opposite sides of the coin.31 
While the Schnyder court operated upon a strong conviction that bulk sale 
provisions are designed to limit bulk sales in an effort to protect the state from 
losing tax revenue, the Hanmi Court’s convictions were more modest, with far 
less of an emphasis on protecting the state department’s interest.32 This section 
explores each case in more detail and lays the foundation for this Comment’s 
argument—that courts should not afford state departments’ interests deriving 
from bulk sale provisions the kind of protection offered in Schnyder, but instead 
should apply the “decline in value” formulation that would have been 
implemented in Hanmi if the state department had proven the amount of the 
decline in its interest.33  
A. Illinois Department of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank 
Hanmi was a consolidated appeal in which the Illinois Department of 
Revenue requested adequate protection of its interests arising from a bulk sale 
provision.34 Because the bankrupt businesses were selling off all of their assets, 
outside their ordinary courses of business, the Illinois Bulk Sale Provision 
applied.35 In facilitating the sale, the bankruptcy court allowed the sale to 
proceed pursuant to § 363(f) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code), resulting in 
IDOR’s interest being stripped away, effectively leaving IDOR with no interest 
in the bankruptcy estate, as well as leaving IDOR without the ability to go after 
the purchaser under successor liability imparted by the bulk sale provision.36 
Because its interest was stripped away, and thus, in its opinion, significantly 
diminished, IDOR requested adequate protection pursuant to § 363(e) of the 
Code.37 However, § 363(e) provides for adequate protection when an entity’s 
interest has diminished in value, and in this case the Court determined, given the 
fact that the senior claims exceeded the amount of the debtors’ assets, IDOR, as 
 
 31 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 468; Schnyder, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 542.  
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. at 478. 
 34 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465. 
 35 Id.; 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 36 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 467.  
 37 Id.  
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a junior creditor, would have received nothing regardless of whether its interest 
remained intact.38 Thus, IDOR’s interest did not diminish in value, because the 
value of its interest had always been $0.39 Given this, IDOR was not entitled to 
adequate protection.40 Because the value of IDOR’s “interest” was $0, the Court 
was able to skirt the question of whether the bulk sale provisions had actually 
created an interest in IDOR.41 The Court assumed the interest without holding 
whether bulk sale provisions create an interest in creditor-revenue 
departments.42  
Despite the fact that IDOR’s interest did not diminish in value, IDOR 
contended its interest diminished in value due to the special nature of that 
interest.43 The thrust of its contention was that its ability to hold the purchaser 
personally liable had real value, because “the purchase price for the debtor’s 
properties necessarily included some amount of consideration for the removal 
of IDOR’s interest.”44 In other words, had IDOR’s interest remained intact, the 
purchaser would have requested a lower purchase price, given the fact that bulk 
sale provisions require the purchaser to reserve a portion of the purchase monies 
to pay the state revenue department for any unpaid taxes owed by the debtor.45 
Since IDOR’s interest was removed, the debtor was able to charge more for the 
property, and thus, the resulting difference in sale price amounted to the value 
of IDOR’s interest.46 The upshot of IDOR’s argument was that it should not have 
mattered whether IDOR’s status as a junior creditor would have resulted in its 
receiving $0 from the sale of the proceeds, because the value of its interest was 
inherently baked into the purchase price.47  
Against this backdrop, we can see that IDOR considered its interest special, 
given the fact it could pursue the purchasers personally should it fail to comply 
with the bulk sale provision stop order.48 Given the removal of that “special 
interest,” pursuant to § 363(f), IDOR felt as though the removal of that interest 
 
 38 Id. at 471.  
 39 Id. at 481. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. at 468. Given the lack of a holding on whether IDOR held a cognizable interest or not, this paper 
will explore whether bulk sale provisions create interests in state revenue departments. 
 43 Id. at 477. 
 44 Id. at 473. 
 45 Id. at 476. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 477. 
 48 Id. at 467–68.  
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constituted consideration that manifested itself in the adjusted (lower) purchase 
price.49 The Court was responsive to this point, stating:  
[I]t is not hard to appreciate IDOR’s position that it would be worth 
something to a bulk-sale purchaser to be able to make its purchase free 
and clear of IDOR’s interest and thus have no worry about successor 
liability—and that the sale price for the debtors’ properties in these 
cases necessarily included a premium for the removal of that interest.50  
The senior creditors (banks) stated that recognizing IDOR’s interest and 
providing it adequate protection would allow IDOR to jump the queue of 
creditors, allowing IDOR to receive monetary protection at the expense of other 
senior creditors. The senior creditors referred to this “as awarding IDOR a post 
hoc priming lien that permits IDOR to assume first place in the creditor 
queue.”51 Bankruptcy courts generally take creditor priority very seriously, and 
the Hanmi Court addressed the bank’s concern by providing justification to the 
notion that IDOR’s claim was different from a post hoc priming lien.52 The 
Court’s justification noted that IDOR’s claim distinguished it from other 
creditors because it allowed IDOR to look past the debtor’s assets and hold the 
purchaser personally liable for any unpaid taxes of the debtor.53 Furthermore, 
because of this distinction, IDOR was not seeking to jump in line; rather, it was 
asking the Court to recognize its possession of a unique interest that goes 
“beyond the corpus of the bankruptcy estate.”54 Finally, and most interestingly, 
the Court stated that the removal of IDOR’s interest constituted consideration 
that was attributable to IDOR rather than any asset of the estate.55 These 
justifications led the Court to state “[w]e shall therefore assume without deciding 
that a court could place a value on IDOR’s right and compensate IDOR 
accordingly from the proceeds of the § 363 sale, even if that would reduce 
the recovery to other, more senior creditors.”56 
 
 49 Id. at 474. 
 50 Id. at 476. 
 51 Id. at 477. 
 52 Id. (Allowing a creditor to jump the queue goes against fundamental principles of the Code, which is 
why the Court took this accusation so seriously).  
 53 Id. at 467. 
 54 Id. at 477. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id. (Given the non-dispositive nature of this statement, the door is left open for normative arguments 
regarding the right of the court to make judgments resulting in senior creditors being “leapt over” by junior 
creditors, a notion that is in conflict with one of the principles of bankruptcy law.). 
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However, despite the Court’s appreciation of IDOR’s argument, the Court 
struggled to place a value on the removal of IDOR’s interest.57 The Court 
reasoned that IDOR assumed it would recover 100% of the unpaid tax liability 
from the purchaser, an assumption that IDOR did not back with meaningful 
evidence.58 Moreover, the Court doubted that IDOR would have ever been able 
to recover 100% of its interest, citing numerous roadblocks to such a complete 
recovery.59  
First, the Court noted that a sensible purchaser would take preventive 
measures to shield itself from any successor liability it might face from IDOR.60 
For example, a buyer is always free to contract around such liability, perhaps by 
placing a clause in the purchase agreement pursuant to which the seller remains 
liable for the delinquent taxes and providing proof that such liability is dealt with 
by the seller.61 Alternatively, the buyer may structure the agreement to ensure 
that a portion of the purchase money was reserved to cover the delinquent taxes, 
at the expense of senior creditors.62 While these measures may not affect IDOR 
negatively, they would affect the debtors’ senior creditors negatively, and in 
turn, those creditors could respond with their own “weapon,” the ability to 
foreclose on the properties.63 In the instant case, a foreclosure on the properties 
would not trigger the bulk sale provisions, and thus, by virtue of the senior 
creditors’ foreclosure authority, the senior creditors have the ability to block a 
sale that they believed unduly favored IDOR at their expense.64 However, the 
Court pointed out that foreclosure sales come with their own impediments 
because they often result in a lower net recovery for senior creditors.65  
Given that both sides have a means to block a sale that does not satisfy them, 
the Court recognized that a compromise between IDOR and the senior creditors 
is often the only approach that can work to leave both sides somewhat pleased.66 
A compromise would entail the bank agreeing to let IDOR, notwithstanding its 
 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 476. 
 59 Id. at 476–77. 
 60 Id. at 478. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. See Hoornstra v. United States, 969 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 63 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 478. 
 64 Id. at 478–79. 
 65 Id. at 479. 
 66 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 479; Stephen T. Bobo, INSIGHT: Creditors Not Required to Share Sale 
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status as a junior creditor, take some portion of the sale proceeds in exchange 
for releasing the purchaser from successor liability for unpaid taxes, and IDOR 
agreeing to accept something less than 100 percent of the amount that the Bulk 
Sales Provisions would allow it to collect.67 With this approach laid out, the 
Court then returned to the question of whether IDOR had sufficiently shown that 
the value of its interest had diminished, and if so, by what amount.68  
The Court reasoned that IDOR’s argument was unpersuasive because IDOR 
had failed to show any evidence indicating it would have received anything for 
the value of its interest.69 For instance, IDOR failed to show that it would have 
received anything for the removal of its interest regarding possible 
negotiations/compromises with the senior lenders.70 Additionally, IDOR failed 
to provide a tangible amount relating to the decrease in sale price stemming from 
the removal of IDOR’s interest.71 In other words, the purchaser paid less than it 
would have for the properties, because IDOR’s successor liability-inducing 
interest was removed, and because IDOR failed to provide an actual amount 
showing the decrease in sale price.72 The Court placed on IDOR the burden of 
providing evidence as to the reduction in the value of its interest for purposes of 
§ 363(e) adequate protection.73 Because IDOR did not quarrel with the burden 
factor, the Court had no problem valuing IDOR’s interest at $0; however, 
interestingly enough, the Court noted that there is some authority suggesting that 
the predominant balance of the burden should be placed on the debtor.74 In doing 
so the Court stated: 
[A] creditor claiming the right to adequate protection bears only the 
minimal threshold burden of establishing the validity, priority, or 
extent of its interest, whereas the debtor (or trustee) must shoulder the 
initial burden of establishing what constitutes adequate protection vis-
 
 67 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 479. 
 68 Id. at 479. 
 69 Id. at 478–79 (IDOR merely assumed that it would recover 100% of the value of its interest, a fact that 
the Court found implausible). 
 70 Id. at 479.  
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 477–78 (If IDOR had shown, hypothetically, that the purchaser would have paid $100 dollars for 
the properties encumbered by IDOR’s interest, but then paid eighty dollars for the properties unencumbered by 
IDOR’s interest, then IDOR would have been able to contend that the value of its interest was worth twenty 
dollars. That twenty dollars could have been adequately protected by § 363(e) and IDOR could have received 
twenty dollars pursuant to that section.). 
 73 Id. at 480. 
 74 Id.  
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à-vis that interest—including the value of the creditor’s interest and 
any decrease therein.75  
Following the foregoing analysis, the Court, without making a definite 
determination as to whether the bulk sale provision created an interest in IDOR, 
and without determining whether the evidential burden was on IDOR itself, or 
rather on the debtor, the Court concluded that there was no evidence showing 
that IDOR’s interest had diminished in value for purposes of adequate protection 
analysis. Thus, the Court valued IDOR’s interest at $0, and IDOR was left 
stripped of its ability to pursue successor liability, as well as the ability to receive 
adequate protection for the stripping of that ability.76 
Although the Hanmi Court ultimately ruled against IDOR, the opinion 
suggests that IDOR could have recovered on its interest, provided it was able to 
prove that its interest declined and by how much. The following case, Schnyder 
v. State Board of Equalization, exemplifies one court’s inclination to protect the 
interests of the state.77 
B. Schnyder v. State Board of Equalization 
Schnyder v. State Board of Equalization is exemplary of a court favoring the 
interests of a state department over that of the purchaser, and indirectly, other 
creditors.78 The case is instructive because California has adopted UCC Article 
6. Schnyder, the purchaser, contracted to buy the grocery store business of 
Arbuckle Food Center, Inc. (Arbuckle), for slightly over $50,000.79 The 
Schnyders proceeded under the applicable bulk sales law and placed the 
purchase money in an escrow account.80 The California Bulk Sales Provision 
provided that a buyer who fails to comply with the notice and creditor payment 
requirements of the provision is liable to a claimant for damages in the amount 
of the claim, reduced by any amount the claimant would not have realized if the 
buyer had complied.81 To address competing creditor claims, the purchaser or 
its escrow agent will often file an interpleader action designed to determine 
 
 75 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2019); Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 480 (citing In re AMR Corp., 490 B.R.470, 477 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
 76 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 480–81. 
 77 Compare Schnyder v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538 (Cal Ct. App. 2012) with Ill. 
Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465 (2018). 
 78 See Schnyder, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538.  
 79 Id. at 542. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 543. 
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which creditors will receive the set aside portion of the purchase money.82 As is 
often the case, creditors laying claim to the set aside funds included the State 
Board of Equalization, and another senior creditor who had a higher priority than 
the Board.83 Following notice of the sale, the Schnyders’ escrow agent received 
multiple creditor claims against Arbuckle that exceeded the amount of the 
escrow fund, including claims from the IRS.84 The Board then determined that 
the Schnyders themselves were liable for the unpaid tax liabilities, totaling 
approximately $30,000.85 After the Schnyders’ escrow agent informed the Board 
of the pending interpleader action, the Board’s attorneys responded with a letter 
stating the “successorship issue as it relates to the Board . . . is not involved in 
the interpleader action. I would suggest that a Petition for Reconsideration [of 
the Board’s successorship determination against the Schnyders].”86 Eventually, 
the Board levied on the Schnyders’ bank account and seized approximately 
$30,000.87 The Schnyders then sued the Board for a tax refund, arguing that the 
interpleader action resolved any issue of successor liability the Board may have 
had against the Schnyders.88 
After the trial court ruled in favor of the Board, the Schnyders appealed.89 
Their appeal alleged three claims, two of which are pertinent to this Comment: 
“(1) they withheld the purchase funds in compliance with section 6811 by 
depositing those funds initially in escrow and then in the interpleader action; (2) 
where multiple and conflicting creditor claims are raised, interpleader under the 
bulk sales law is the appropriate course of conduct . . . .”90 In assessing these 
claims, the court put an emphasis on the statutory language of § 6811 (the bulk 
sale provision section).91 The court relied on a sixty year-old case, People v. 
Buckles, to infer the legislative intent of the statute, stating:  
[I]t was the intention of the Legislature . . . to prevent a retailer who 
has failed to pay the state all of the tax due . . . from selling his 
business and departing with the purchase price . . . by imposing . . . a 
 
 82 Id. at 543–44. 
 83 Id. at 544. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 87 See generally id. 
 88 See generally id. 
 89 See generally id.  
 90 See generally id. 
 91 See id. 
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statutory liability to pay the amount due . . . up to the amount of the 
purchase price.92  
With legislative intent in mind, the court moved on to discuss the Schnyders’ 
claims.93 The court was not persuaded by the claim that the Schnyders 
successfully “withheld” the funds by placing them in an escrow account and 
interpleading them.94 In refuting the claim, the court noted two points. The first 
was that the Schnyders’ interpleader action included a claim from a creditor 
superior to the Board (the IRS) that exceeded the purchase amount interpleaded. 
Because of this, the Schnyders had not actually made the funds available to the 
Board. Instead, they had merely placed the funds in a common pool by which 
there was no guarantee that the Board would receive payment.95 The second was 
that the Schnyders had failed to receive clearance, proof that the sellers had 
satisfied the unpaid taxes due to the Board.96 The reasoning behind these two 
points is instructive. The first point demonstrates a strict reading of a bulk sale 
provision. If courts are willing to disregard interpleader actions by holding the 
purchaser liable regardless of how the Code’s priority scheme determines 
interpleader actions, then purchasers will be further dissuaded from engaging in 
bulk sales that are accompanied by a bankruptcy proceeding. Since the 
legislative intent infers a desire to block sales that are only being performed in 
contemplation of avoiding tax liability, this consequence seems to flow 
naturally. The second point naturally follows, by requiring the purchaser to 
obtain clearance, the legislature was trying to ensure that even those sellers 
engaging in bulk sales would not be doing so simply to skirt their tax liability. 
The court further explored the goal of the legislature was further explored 
by the court as it examined the Schnyders’ contention that where multiple and 
conflicting claims are being asserted in excess of the purchase price, interpleader 
is the correct form of action. The Schnyders’ claim was contentious because it 
stemmed from the fact that the bulk sales provision that was relied upon had 
 
 92 Id. at 545–46 (“We grant the Board’s request to take judicial notice of certain out-of-state decisional 
and statutory law on the subject of successor liability. This authority confirms that successor liability statutes 
substantively identical to those in California abound across the country. The purpose of these statutes is generally 
recognized as ensuring the collection of state sales taxes by imposing liability upon the purchasing entity. They 
recognize that the purchaser ordinarily is in a financially better position to collect the tax than the selling entity, 
which is quitting the business. These successor liability statutes envision the tax debt following the business, its 
assets or any portion of them.”).  
 93 See id. at 546. 
 94 See id.  
 95 Id. at 547. 
 96 Id.  
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twin aims—one concerned regular creditors, and the other with affording tax 
agencies the ability to assert successor liability.97 Essentially, the Schnyders 
were arguing that the court should weigh the aim designed to protect regular 
creditors over the successor liability angle.98 The court reasoned that this 
argument would deny the state the specific remedy of successor liability.99 In 
doing so, the court provided two reasons. The first being that “public interest in 
the collection of taxes outweighs the private interest in the transfer of business 
assets.”100 The second being that “successor liability statutes set forth a special 
requirement in contrast to the more general bulk sales statutes, or provide a 
remedy distinct from the bulk sales remedies.”101 The demarcation between bulk 
sale provisions aimed at protecting regular creditors and that of the successor 
liability provisions aimed at protecting tax collecting agencies was central to the 
Schnyders’ emphasis that an interpleader action was a proper response. If the 
court was to find the interpleader action satisfactory for discharging the 
Schnyders’ obligation, the court would have sided with the notion that the 
Code’s priority scheme should trump any other analysis. However, the court 
decided to once again return to the legislative intent of the aggregated bulk sale 
provision, weighing in favor of the Board. The court cited a fifty year-old 
California law review article that concluded that if “the seller cannot or will not 
provide funds to discharge the conflicting claims, the buyer’s only practical 
alternative may well be to back out of the transaction.”102  
The article went on to claim that this backing out was an expected 
consequence, writing “[t]hat is the point. The buyer of a business that owes state 
taxes cannot hide behind the bulk sales law and avoid personal 
liability . . . . [S]uccessor liability statutes exist so that the transfer of business 
assets cannot be used to evade the payment of taxes.”103 With this, the court 
made known that it would defend the state’s ability to impose successor liability, 
because the threat of that imposition was designed to inhibit bulk sales aimed at 
discharging tax liability. The final relevant contention made by the Schnyders—
that they should not be forced to pay the tax of a third party simply because the 
 
 97 Id. at 546. 
 98 Id. at 545–46.  
 99 Id. at 548.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 549. 
 103 Id. 
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Board failed to prove its right to the purchase proceeds in the interpleader 
action—was also rejected by the court.104 
Schnyder v. State Board of Equalization marks one court’s willingness to 
defend the state’s ability to impose successor liability, even in the face of an 
interpleader action that determined the state did not have a right to the funds.105 
Such a strong implementation of a bulk sale provision highlights certain courts’ 
willingness to defend state agencies even when the Code does not afford the 
same protection to an agency. 
There is a stark contrast between the Hanmi Court’s reluctance to make a 
solid affirmation on how bulk sales provisions should be treated and the 
Schynder court’s insistence on protecting the ability of the state department to 
fully utilize such provisions.106 The varying approaches of each court highlights 
two competing policy approaches coloring the issues presented by bulk sale 
provisions. On the one hand, despite the Hanmi Court’s reluctance to make a 
firm determination on how bulk sale provisions should be dealt with in a 
bankruptcy, the Hanmi Court suggests an inclination to favor the rights of other 
creditors instead of the rights belonging to a state department. This preferential 
treatment follows from the Court’s recognition that by allowing a state 
department to assert successor liability, the purchase price will drop resulting in 
a smaller recovery for senior creditors. In this way, the ability to impose 
successor liability is seen as more of a hindrance to the administration of a 
bankruptcy estate, rather than a tool that may be used by states to not only collect 
unpaid taxes, but also as a means to dissuade purchasers from even entering into 
a bulk sale in the first place. The Schnyder court adopted a viewpoint more in 
line with the latter goal—by imposing successor liability in the face of an 
interpleader action that sought to invalidate that ability, the Schnyder court 
reinforces the idea that state department’s interests in imposing successor 
liability should be elevated over the interests of other creditors.  
These competing policy concerns are central to the issue of how bulk sales 
provisions should be treated in conjunction with a bankruptcy. Should the 
protection of state interests give way to bankruptcy distributions that follow 
customary bankruptcy priority rules? Or should the interests of state departments 
afford special privileges deriving from the way in which bulk sale provisions 
allow for reimbursement outside of bankruptcy, pursuant to successor liability 
 
 104 Id. at 550. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Compare Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2018) with Schnyder 
v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538, 548 (Cal Ct. App. 2012). 
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doctrine? To provide for a fair administration of a bankruptcy estate, while also 
recognizing the special ability that bulk sale provisions afford state departments, 
it seems the answer to these questions lands somewhere in the middle.  
II. ANALYSIS 
Bankruptcy courts would do well to mirror the Hanmi Court, which 
recognized the desires of both senior creditors and state departments by utilizing 
a “decline in value” approach. Such an approach will require state departments 
to prove their interest declined in value—a requirement that ultimately 
necessitates communication between a state department and all relevant parties, 
to help place a value on the decline of that interest. Such a requirement forces 
communication and encourages compromise. This Comment will further 
explore the questions present in Hanmi and Schnyder, ultimately arguing that 
the approach hinted at in Hanmi was sound. 
A. Does a Bulk Sale Provision Create an Interest in a State Revenue 
Department? 
The Court in Illinois Department of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank refrained from 
deciding whether a bulk sale provision creates an interest in a state revenue 
department.107 Instead, the Court premised its decision on the fact that IDOR 
failed to provide any accurate valuation as to the amount of its interest.108 The 
Seventh Circuit’s avoidance of this question leaves not only the question of 
whether bulk sales provisions create an interest in a state department, but also, 
how such an “interest” should be treated. This question, along with relevant 
policy concerns, are discussed below.  
Although the Code does not define the term “interest” for purposes of 
§ 363(f), courts have generally applied the term broadly.109 For instance, courts 
have held that employment-related claims, such as employment discrimination 
claims, constitute an interest, and that employee-sponsored benefit plans 
constitute an interest, as well as claims flowing from the ownership of 
property.110 The broad interpretation of “interest” may seem to support the 
 
 107 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 468.  
 108 Id. 
 109 See Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Trans 
World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3rd Cir. 2003); United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie 
Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 586–87 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Elk Grove 
Vill. Petroleum, 510 B.R. 594, 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).  
 110 See Precision Indus., 327 F.3d at 545; In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d at 289; In re Leckie 
Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d at 586–87; In re Elk Grove Vill. Petroleum, 510 B.R. at 603. 
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notion that courts wish to view claims as interests to maximize the number of 
creditors who can claim a right to payment. However, given this interpretation 
of § 363(f), the impetus behind this reasoning likely stems from courts’ desire 
to administer the bankruptcy estate in an efficient manner, meaning that §363(f) 
is a mechanism by which “interests” are stripped during a sale—allowing that 
sale to proceed free and clear of any encumbrances attaching to the estate. In 
other words, § 363(f) allows the trustee to tinker with which interests remain 
viable during a bankruptcy estate sale. Moreover, removing interests that the 
trustee deems adverse to the efficient administration of the estate allows the 
estate to maximize value in a bankruptcy sale, ensuring that estate funds are used 
to provide the most benefit to creditors. Given the relevant policy considerations, 
it is easy to understand why a trustee would want to strip away a state revenue 
department’s “interest” in delinquent taxes, especially considering such an 
interest allows the state department to utilize successor liability—a function that 
negatively affects the value of an asset in a bulk sale.111 
The Court in Illinois Department of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank did not make a 
clear determination on whether bulk sales provisions create an interest in the 
state revenue department.112 Instead, given the fact the Court planned on valuing 
IDOR’s “interest” at $0, the Court assumed the Bulk Sales Provision created 
such an interest, for argument’s sake. Thus, the question of whether bulk sales 
provisions create an interest in the state revenue department is still open to other 
courts in the Seventh Circuit. This inquiry does not entail whether a state 
department has a cognizable claim; if the state department is owed delinquent 
taxes by a debtor, it of course can assert a claim against that debtor. Rather, the 
inquiry deals with whether the means to pursue transferee liability via a bulk 
sale statute constitutes an interest that is protectable by § 363(e).113  
The Hanmi Court’s unwillingness to determine whether a state department’s 
ability to pursue successor liability constituted an interest is puzzling. If that 
ability did not constitute an interest, then the trustee would have had nothing to 
strip away via § 363(f). But where would that leave the state department? The 
bulk sales provision would still be applicable, so it stands to reason that the state 
would be able to utilize it to go after the successor. Owing to this, it seems 
apparent that a trustee would hope for the recognition of a successor liability 
interest, because then the trustee has the ability to strip that interest. Surely 
 
 111 In a bulk sale, the presence of an interest that may result in successor liability is sure to drive down the 
purchase price, and in turn, results in the estate recovering less during the sale of such an asset.  
 112 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 468. 
 113 See id.; In re Elk Grove Vill. Petroleum, 510 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).  
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though, this could result in that interest being adequately protected by 
§ 363(e)—leaving the question right back where it started—how to deal with 
that interest. Given this non sequitur, it is likely that the Hanmi Court was 
unwilling to determine not whether the bulk sales provision created an interest, 
but rather, what type of interest was created.  
In passing on the issue, the Hanmi Court still provided a suitable framework 
for classifying such an interest. The Hanmi Court recognized that the removal 
of such an interest constitutes consideration inherently baked into the purchase 
price.114 That is, the purchase price lowers once the interest is removed. Because 
of this, the interest should be recognized, and is distinguishable from other 
claims that normally get stripped away. Owing to the interest’s special nature, it 
would be wise for courts to recognize such an interest and follow the framework 
for valuation that was hinted at in Hanmi, that is, the decline in value 
formulation. 
In Hanmi, the state department argued that the removal of its interest resulted 
in a reduction of the sale price, and thus that removal constituted consideration 
for which IDOR should be protected.115 However, aside from the consideration 
argument, IDOR also had the ability to argue whether its claim should have been 
given higher priority.116  
B. Should Interests Created via Bulk Sales Provisions be Entitled Special 
Priority? 
Given the special type of interest created by bulk sales provisions, as well as 
the fact the interest holder is a state government entity, it is worth discussing 
whether bulk sales interests should be afforded special priority, which would 
allow them to transcend their typical status as a junior creditor.  
The court in In Re Elk Grove Village Petroleum laid out the Code’s approach 
to priority of claims.117 The court made clear that while the Code lays out the 
relative priorities of classes of claims, bankruptcy law will still recognize 
creditors’ interests afforded to them by state law, unless a federal law requires a 
different result.118 In IDOR’s case, the question became whether or not the bulk 
 
 114 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 467–68.  
 115 See id. at 468.  
 116 See In re Elk Grove Vill. Petroleum, 510 B.R. at 600 (this is one of the arguments posited in the 
predecessor to the consolidation hearing that was Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank). 
 117 See generally id. at 599. 
 118 See id. at 600 (internal citation omitted).  
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sales provision created a general unsecured claim in IDOR, or something that 
would allow for a higher priority claim, such as a lien attaching to a piece of 
property of the debtor, securing the payment of the delinquent taxes.119 The court 
in In Re Elk Grove Village Petroleum recognized that this was a question of first 
impression.120 Being a question of first impression, it is worthwhile to discuss 
whether such a claim should receive priority, given that such a claim derives its 
force from state authority. 
One of the principle policy considerations of bankruptcy law is allowing for 
creditors to receive payment in the correct priority under applicable bankruptcy 
law. As the Code stands today, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units 
receive eighth priority.121 Among other things, this Code provision applies to the 
allowed claims of governmental units for taxes owed by the debtor.122 Given that 
the Code only considers allowed unsecured claims of a governmental unit to 
warrant eighth priority, the Code is aimed at satisfying other debts before 
worrying about a governmental unit’s ability to secure unpaid taxes. Allowing a 
state revenue department to hold higher priority claims pursuant to a state law 
that allowed for the claim would be contrary to this very principle. The majority 
of states delineate priority on a “first in time” basis,123 meaning that claims 
recorded and secured before others will receive a higher priority.124 Thus, a state 
revenue department will typically not be high priority—a debtor usually incurs 
debt from non-state sources such as banks and other financiers, for things like 
inventory, property, or other tangible items before it begins skipping out on tax 
payments. For example, a start-up company will likely take out loans to get its 
operation going, and, such loans will often be taken at the inception of the 
company. Once the company starts failing, it will begin to avoid tax payments 
to keep receiving inventory and to pay other administrative expenses, in an effort 
to try and get the company out of the red. Therefore, a state department’s claim 
will arise far later than other creditors. Additionally, the other creditors are more 
likely to secure their loans against property of the debtor, whereas a state revenue 
department does not “secure” tax payments in the usual sense. For instance, a 
state revenue department can impose liability via other means, such as a 
successor liability pursuant to a bulk sale provision.  
Despite the fact that state department claims will typically be placed at the 
 
 119 See id. at 600–601.  
 120 See id. at 598. 
 121 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2019). 
 122 See § 507(a)(8)(C). 
 123 Accord In re Elk Grove Vill. Petroleum, 510 B.R. at 602. 
 124 See id.  
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end of the line, there are policy concerns that weigh against placing a higher 
priority on the allowed unsecured claims of governmental units. One example is 
the promotion of a private actor’s freedom to engage in lending. If the Code were 
to prioritize the allowed unsecured claims of a governmental unit, it may have a 
chilling effect on a lending organization’s desire to make loans. This effect 
would stem from the fact that additional roadblocks to the repayment of lenders, 
i.e., governmental unit priority, would create more competition for the scant 
assets in a bankruptcy distribution. It is more harmful to de-prioritize private 
creditors than governmental units because of the likely negative effect that 
would follow from a hindrance to the free movement of capital. In other words, 
a private lender’s knowledge that it will receive lower priority within a 
bankruptcy administration elevates the risk it takes when deciding to make a 
loan. Public policy should seek to encourage lending, rather than stagnate it. 
Conversely, no such discouragement occurs when the deprioritized party is a 
governmental unit. The unit’s place in the equation is static—taxes will be levied 
in the same manner regardless of the priority laid out in the Code.125 With a little 
planning and tinkering, the administrative expense offers an additional avenue 
for state departments to argue that their interest should receive higher priority. 
Absent from the Hanmi Court’s discussion of priority was the fact that tax 
liabilities are afforded second level priority in chapter 11 reorganization 
pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(B).126 This section affords second priority for the 
payment of administrative expenses used to keep an entity that is proceeding 
through chapter 11 operational.127 The section provides, in relevant part,  
After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative 
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, 
including— . . . any tax— . . . (i) incurred by the estate, whether 
secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which liability is in 
rem, in personam, or both, except a tax of a kind specified in section 
507(a)(8) of this title . . . .128 
This allows for the estate to remain business operational by using credit to cover 
taxes and other administrative expenses. It then ensures that these administrative 
expense creditors will receive a higher priority—since granting credit to an 
 
 125 This is assuming that governmental units do not assess the imposition of taxes at a higher rate with the 
thought in mind that some citizens will fail to pay the taxes. It is unlikely that a governmental unit sets the 
amount of its taxes with risk management in mind. 
 126 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (2019). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id.  
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already bankrupt debtor allowed that debtor to remain a going concern in lieu of 
liquidation.129 
On its face, there is a key difference between a chapter 11 reorganization 
aimed at keeping a business afloat and a bulk sale in which the debtor is selling 
off the majority of its assets outside the normal course of business. For one, the 
latter does not entitle the state department to any special priority protection as 
an administrative expense. This is sensible considering that the state department 
did not provide the non-payment of taxes on credit to keep the debtor’s business 
up and running. However, the mechanism by which the non-payment of taxes 
occurs is likely to be very similar.  
In a reorganization (scenario A), a business may forego the payment of taxes 
pursuant to an agreement by which the taxes are paid as credit, to be paid back 
later. State departments can justify lending credit to an already bankrupt debtor 
because they know they will receive higher priority. In the event the 
reorganization fails, it is still entitled to that higher priority and should receive 
its amount of those back taxes when the case is converted to chapter 7 and the 
debtor’s assets are liquidated. Should the case succeed, the state department will 
assuredly receive 100% of the tax money, because the business will return to 
profitability.  
This process plays out similarly in the timeline of a debtor that initiates a 
bulk sale (scenario B). For example, a debtor/business will forego paying its 
taxes to remain operational and take on credit for business related expenses such 
as inventory renewal, rent payments, or other costs associated with operating an 
ongoing business. 
In each scenario, the motivation for the non-payment of taxes is the same—
an attempt to keep the debtor’s business a going concern. However, the treatment 
of the state department is drastically different in each scenario. In scenario A, 
the state department is entitled to a second-level administrative expense priority 
which virtually ensures it will receive a large portion of the unpaid taxes. In 
scenario B, the state department is likely a junior creditor, with no administrative 
expense priority, and will likely receive a much smaller portion of the unpaid 
 
 129 The reasoning behind this section is as follows; a business going through chapter 11 can maximize its 
value by maintaining its status as a going concern (an operational entity). The thinking is that by remaining 
operational, a business will be able to pay back more of its creditors than if the business was just liquidated and 
the proceeds used to pay back creditors. This is especially true for businesses in which it is likely the business 
will return to profitable—should a business return to being profitable, 100% of its creditors will be able to be 
paid back, whereas, if that business was liquidated from the start, it is unlikely that 100% of its creditors would 
be paid back.  
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taxes, if anything. The only difference between the two scenarios is the timing 
of the filing for bankruptcy. In scenario A, the debtor files for reorganization, 
and the taxes protected pursuant to the administrative expenses are those that 
follow post-petition, in an effort to keep operating costs of the business low to 
help keep the business operational. In scenario B, despite the back taxes likely 
stemming from the desire of the debtor to keep its business operational, since 
the taxes accrued before the filing of bankruptcy, they are not entitled to any 
administrative expense priority. 
Given that the difference in treatment that befalls state departments in bulk 
sales follows from the timing of when a debtor files for bankruptcy, is it possible 
for a state department to anticipate a bankruptcy filing and respond accordingly 
in order to receive administrative expense priority? This would involve the state 
department staying on top of unpaid taxes, and once those taxes reach a threshold 
that the department declared suitable, intervene by contacting the debtor and 
requesting that it pay its taxes. Should the debtor refuse, the state department 
could file an involuntary bankruptcy petition. If the petition were granted, and 
bankruptcy commenced, the state department could then contract with the debtor 
to provide for the present and future tax payments on credit, thus ensuring that 
the state department could obtain the protection of § 503(b)(1)(B) administrative 
expense priority. If the petition were not granted, there would be no further harm. 
At the very least, the state department would stay on top of unpaid taxes owed 
to it by each debtor that reaches the specific threshold. Although this would not 
result in the prepetition unpaid taxes being covered by § 503(b)(1)(B), it would 
allow the state department to get a leg up on the non-payment of taxes and afford 
some extra protection in case the debtor planned on filing for bankruptcy, which 
would leave the state department at the back of the line. Of course, this would 
take a very proactive state department. At any given time, there are surely 
thousands of entities in a state who fail to stay current on tax payments. This is 
where the intervention threshold would come in. Once unpaid taxes reach a 
certain amount, the state department would intervene and effectuate a plan by 
which its taxes may be protected pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(B) administrative 
expense priority.130 Given the resulting fact that most interests deriving from 
bulk sale provisions will result in a lower priority, the scenario almost always 
involves a struggle between a state’s property rights and an individual’s property 
rights. 
 
 130 Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2018); In re Elk Grove Vill. Petroleum, 
510 B.R. 594, 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). For example, in Hanmi and related cases, the amount owed to IDOR 
was $1,881,648.60. Almost $2 million in debt seems like a reasonable benchmark for a state department to go 
above and beyond to ensure its right to those taxes are as strongly protected as possible. 
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The question of whether a state government should possess priority status 
over private property rights has been addressed by many courts, albeit in 
different fashions from the instant case. In Commonwealth, Dep’t of Revenue, 
Bureau of Corp. Taxes v. Marros, a Pennsylvania court determined that private 
property rights may sometimes be superseded by an important governmental 
interest.131 In that case, a purchaser failed to comply with 72 P.S. § 1403, a 
Pennsylvania bulk sale provision that required a purchaser who was buying at 
least fifty-one percent of a company’s assets to receive clearance indicating that 
there were no back taxes owed by the company.132 After the sale had gone 
through, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue sought payment from the 
purchaser.133 The purchaser contended that there was a computational error in 
assessing the back taxes owed, and, it requested a revision of the owed taxes.134 
The court denied the revision, stating that had the purchaser complied with the 
clearance order, it would have had an opportunity to raise the computational 
error at a prior time.135 The purchasers responded by arguing that its due process 
rights had been violated—it had been deprived of property without being granted 
the ability to dispute that deprivation.136 The court, however, found that 
argument unpersuasive, stating “[t]here is an exception to that general rule, 
however. Where an important governmental interest such as collecting revenue 
exists, private property rights must yield to governmental needs.”137  
Despite a differing fact pattern, the Marros case draws some similarities with 
Hanmi.138 The obvious similarity is that both cases deal with a state trying to 
recover back taxes pursuant to a bulk sale provision.139  
Additionally, both cases question whether a state’s right to taxes should 
 
 131 See generally Commonwealth, Dep’t of Revenue, Bureau of Corp. Taxes v. Marros, 431 A.2d 392, 
393–394 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).  
 132 See generally id. at 392.  
 133 See generally id. at 392–394.  
 134 See id. at 392.  
 135 See id. at 392–394.  
 136 See id.  
 137 Id. at 393–394  (referencing the ability of an individual who is deprived of property to be able to contest 
that deprivation in a court of law). Thirty-three years after Marros, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
would hint at a narrower reading of Marros in dictum of Reese’s Pizza & More v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 93 
A.3d 914 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (“absent a legitimate due process challenge, equity has no jurisdiction to 
restrain the collection of taxes . . . [w]here an important governmental interest such as collecting revenue exists, 
private property rights must yield to governmental need.”). This suggests that the “governmental need” 
schematic of Marros is not applicable if there is truly a deprivation of due process rights—a notion that all courts 
should be eager to protect. 
 138 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392; Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 139 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392; Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465. 
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outweigh a private property right: The right to due process involving a 
government taking of property in Marros and the right to priority payment of a 
secured creditor in Hanmi.140 Most importantly, however, both cases deal with 
the question of whether a state’s law may ever supersede federal law.141 In 
Marros, the court placed the interest of the state above that of constitutional due 
process concerns.142 Granted, the court did not directly contradict the 
Constitution in favor of state law. Rather, it chose to work around the 
Constitution by determining that the due process rights at issue did not apply.143 
The court in Hanmi did not even address the constitutional question, choosing 
to sidestep any issues of due process by alleging that IDOR failed to give a value 
for the diminishment of its interest.144 
Given the relative similarities of Marros and Hanmi, it is suitable to wonder 
whether the Marros court exceeded its boundaries. By depriving the purchasers 
of its right to dispute the amount in question, the Marros court operated 
dangerously close to endorsing an unconstitutional taking.145 By taking the 
stance that governmental needs sometimes outweigh private property rights, the 
Marros court opened the door for the Pennsylvania government to protect its 
own needs over the private property rights of individuals.146 Courts facing 
similar scenarios as Hanmi should stray far away from the Marros decision. 
Given the complexities of the scenario that Hanmi entails, what would such a 
scenario look like?  
In a Hanmi-like case in which a state department wishes to have its interest 
in successor liability protected, an outright taking of property is not implicated. 
Instead, the taking would be framed indirectly. The state department would 
request adequate protection because of the decline in value of its interest.147 The 
state department would have to show that it would have received a portion of the 
purchase money in the bulk sale, pursuant to the bulk sale provision, had that 
interest not been stripped away. That portion would likely be protected by 
§ 363(e), provided the court was willing to recognize the “special interest” 
created by the ability to seek successor liability. This protection would be to the 
detriment of other creditors, in different ways, depending on the nature of the 
 
 140 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392; Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465. 
 141 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392; Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465. 
 142 See Marros, 431 A.2d at 394. 
 143 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392. 
 144 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 480. 
 145 Marros, 431 A.2d at 394. 
 146 See Marros, 431 A.2d 392. 
 147 As we know, the decline in value would not stem from a direct decline in value of the interest, but 
rather a decline in value following from the inability to seek out payment by means of successor liability.  
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protection. The straightforward way to afford adequate protection to a state 
department would simply be to allow for a distribution of assets of the estate 
commensurate to the amount the state department was able to prove it would 
have received through means of successor liability. This would involve the state 
department negotiating with creditors beforehand and setting the amount the 
creditors were willing to concede for the removal of the state’s ability to seek 
payment through successor liability. This places a burden on the creditors—it 
would not receive the full amount of the claim that they are owed through normal 
Code application.  
A second approach to affording a state department adequate protection 
would be to simply allow the state department to maintain its interest deriving 
from the bulk sales provision in order to maintain the state department’s ability 
to utilize successor liability against the purchaser. Courts like the one in 
Schnyder would likely follow a similar approach, given their desire to protect 
state departments by using the threat of bulk sales provisions as a way to 
dissuade purchasers. In this scenario, the purchaser will undoubtedly 
negotiate148 for a lower purchase price because of its knowledge that it will also 
have to pay for the back taxes of the seller. This negotiation would be determined 
by the extent to which the state department planned to enforce the bulk sales 
provision. Essentially, the creditors would be at the mercy of a state department 
that will likely be demanding 100% of the taxes owed to it. This would result in 
the purchase price being lowered by the full amount of the state department’s 
claim. This would allow the state department to jump the line of creditors and 
receive its payment in full, to the detriment of all other creditors. Given the fact 
that most debtors do not have the ability to pay back all of their creditors in full, 
there would be creditors left without recompense, while the state department 
reaps its full reward.  
Between the two approaches listed above, the second approach draws heavy 
similarities to the deprivation of property rights present in Marros, and echoes a 
hardline approach of defending state departments that is akin to Schnyder.149 If 
a court were to adequately protect the “special interest” held by the state 
department by allowing the state department to retain its right to seek successor 
liability, that court would also be depriving the private property rights of 
 
 148 If a state department was able to seek successor liability unfettered, then it would certainly seek to go 
after the entirety of the unpaid taxes. This would result in the purchaser requesting that the purchase price be the 
original price less the amount of unpaid taxes. In this way, the state department gets its full payment to the 
detriment of all other creditors. 
 149 See Marros, 431 A.2d at 392–93. 
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creditors, albeit indirectly, without allowing those private creditors a chance to 
defend their property rights in court. Despite Marros’s acquiescence to this 
injustice,150 the countervailing interests of protecting private property rights, as 
well as the ability of the trustee to make determinations that will benefit the 
majority of creditors, weigh heavily in favor of denying adequate protection 
through the above method. Regardless of whether the state department’s interest 
is “special” or not, the consequences of affording it protection not available with 
a traditional application of § 363(e) are too grave.  
Adequate protection coming in the form of a negotiation between a state 
department and the other creditors in bankruptcy administration implicates due 
process deprivations in a much hazier way. If the bankruptcy court required that 
adequate protection be granted and ordered that the trustee or other creditors 
negotiate with the state department for a removal of the ability to seek successor 
liability, the court is essentially mandating an action that will result in the 
deprivation of those creditor’s property rights. This implicates similar notions of 
a private actor’s inability to dispute its deprivation of privacy. However, by 
allowing the private actor to negotiate the amount, that actor is acquiescing to 
the deprivation of property. This consent would shield the action from being 
considered a due process violation, or at least give credence to the idea that such 
an action was not a deprivation of due process.  
Additionally, a court need not mandate any negotiation or action. If courts 
were to adopt a similar framework to the decline in value formulation of Hanmi, 
which would involve a state department litigating over how much it would 
receive based on the decline of its interest, the mere threat of litigation would 
encourage both sides to settle on an agreed upon figure.  
Despite the fact that the most likely scenario befalling state departments is 
that their interests will receive lower priority, the Code should not afford such 
interests special priority. Rather, courts should leave it up to state departments 
to litigate over the value of their interests, in an effort to promote settlement. By 
encouraging settlement, courts can allow the interests of all parties to be 
determined based on what they are willing to pay for the realization of their 
interests. 
If we couple the notion that courts tend to implement a broad interpretation 
of what constitutes an interest, with the reality that state revenue departments’ 
claims typically arise later than other secured creditors, we are left with the fact 
 
 150 Marros, 431 A.2d at 394. 
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that state departments will normally possess a lower-priority interest in the 
debtor’s assets, when that debtor owes delinquent taxes and sells the majority of 
its assets outside of its ordinary course of business. However, given the revenue 
department’s special power to utilize successor liability, we reach a new problem 
of how to value such an interest, considering that this special interest allows the 
state revenue department to affect a bulk sale in numerous ways.  
C. What Value Should be Placed on Interests Created by Bulk Sales 
Provisions? 
The valuation problem only arises if parties fail to reach a settlement 
regarding the removal of the state department interest. In lieu of an agreement, 
state departments should have to prove what value they would receive had their 
interest not been stripped. 
A court analyzing the value of an interest derived from a bulk sales provision 
will be faced with competing viewpoints. On the one hand, a state department 
will be arguing that this interest is “special” because of the way in which it can 
be realized via successor liability outside of the normal administration of assets 
within a bankruptcy case. On the other hand, creditors in opposition of the state 
department’s view will assert that the value of such an interest should stop with 
§ 363(f), that is, once the bulk sale takes place free and clear of the state 
department’s interest, that interest no longer exists. It has already been 
established that a state department requesting adequate protection of its interest 
carries the burden of showing that the interest has declined in value. 
Furthermore, a state department will contend its interest has diminished in value 
because of its inability to seek successor liability. This leaves a court with two 
options: (1) Recognizing that decline in value following the removal of 
successor liability rights and valuing the interest at what those successor liability 
rights would have amounted to if realized, or (2) stripping away the “special 
interest” formulation altogether and valuing that interest at $0. This section 
explores the practical considerations of valuing a bulk sales provision interest in 
light of each above option. 
Given the unique power that interests created by bulk sales provisions carry, 
it is understandable for a state department to consider more than just the face 
value of the interest, when making its case during valuation. Important 
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considerations focus on the value created for the estate by the removal of the 
interest, as well as the bargaining power carried by such an interest.151 
A good starting point for how to value an interest created by a bulk sale 
provision is the distinction between calculable value and realizable value. This 
analysis is most applicable when assessing how an interest should be valued to 
provide adequate protection of that interest pursuant to § 363(e).152 According 
to the court in Hanmi, calculable value refers to the value of an interest, absent 
the effect any payment plans will have on that interest.153 For example, if a state 
revenue department has a claim for $5 million, the calculable value of that 
interest is $5 million. On the other hand, realizable value refers to the value that 
the creditor will actually realize. To use the above example, if a state department 
has a claim for $5 million, but it is a junior creditor in a case in which the debtor’s 
assets amount to only $4 million, the realizable value of the state department’s 
interest is $0, because it will not be able to realize any of the value of its 
interest.154 In determining what protection should be afforded to an interest 
holder, the court considers realizable value, rather than calculable value.155 Thus, 
a revenue department must show that its interest actually diminished in value. In 
other words, the state department must show that it would have at least recovered 
some portion of its interest, had that interest not been stripped, for it to receive 
any adequate protection as to the value of its interest.156 Despite the foregoing 
analysis, the question remains whether a junior-creditor-state-department’s 
interest should be valued at $0 in an above scenario, given that bulk sale interests 
come with special powers.  
Bulk sale provisions give state revenue departments a powerful tool to use 
in the administration of a bankruptcy estate. However, as we saw in Hanmi, this 
interest may be stripped away pursuant to § 363(f).157 In stripping away this 
interest, value is created for the estate, because it allows the estate to receive 
more in a bulk sale than it would if the successor tax liability interest still 
 
 151 This bargaining power stems from the state department’s ability to go after the purchaser personally. 
Because of this power, the state department can influence the purchase price, and can essentially dissuade 
potential purchasers from moving forward with a purchase. Should the sale proceed free and clear of the state 
department’s interest pursuant to § 363(f), the state department may threaten litigation, a situation which will 
further detract from the value of the estate, and, in turn, detract from the proceeds slated to go to senior creditors. 
 152 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2019). 
 153 Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 154 This analysis is notwithstanding any special respect the court gives to the state department, given its 
ability to go after the purchaser via successor liability.  
 155 Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 471. 
 156 Id. at 476–77. 
 157 Id. at 471.  
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accompanied the assets. As the court in Hanmi recognized, the removal of this 
type of interest may constitute consideration, which allows placing a value on 
the interest itself. Thus, one way to value such an interest is by subtracting the 
final purchase price (sans the state department’s interest) from the original 
purchase price (the price if the state department’s interest remained attached to 
the assets). The problem with this approach is that it is nearly impossible to know 
what the original purchase price would have been. If the sale proceeds in this 
bimodal fashion, either the interest remains attached or the interest is stripped 
away.  
However, there is one possible way in which this problem can be reconciled. 
Rather than having the trustee decide unilaterally whether an interest should be 
stripped away or not, the Code could provide for the trustee to offer two options 
to the purchaser in a bulk sale of assets encumbered by bulk sale interests. 
Option A would allow the buyer to purchase the assets encumbered by the bulk 
sale interest. From here, the buyer would negotiate a price it believes the assets 
should be valued, considering the fact that they are still encumbered by a 
successor liability inducing interest. Option B would allow the buyer to purchase 
the assets unencumbered. Of course, option A would result in the buyer paying 
less for the assets than option B. The difference in the purchase price of each 
option would be the price at which we could value the state department’s 
interest. Therefore, the buyer would have to negotiate a price for both options 
and allow the trustee to choose whether it would be worth stripping the interest 
and selling at a higher price, or letting the interest remain and selling at a lower 
price. Although this solution would make valuing a bulk sale interest much 
easier, it too runs into a problem.  
If the trustee chooses to sell the assets at a lower price, encumbered by the 
bulk sale interest, the trustee is essentially allowing the state department to jump 
the creditor queue—the same problem caused by the bulk sales provision in the 
first place. However, this may be a non-issue because a prudent trustee would 
likely always choose the higher purchase price to ensure senior creditors can 
recover the most value possible.158 Essentially, this approach would provide the 
trustee with a better means of valuing a bulk sale interest, as well as the freedom 
to administer the estate with a better understanding of the relevant parties’ 
 
 158 One downside of this approach is that it seems a moot point to ask a purchaser what price they would 
be willing to pay in each scenario, especially when the purchaser has a good sense of what option the trustee 
will choose. It raises a question of whether such a negotiation to produce options that allow for a valuation is 
merely artificial, and whether or not it is an accurate way to value such an interest.  
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interests. However, there is authority suggesting that the burden of valuing 
interests for purposes of adequate protection is on the debtor.159 Given this 
notion, the above approach would allow the debtor to satisfy that burden by 
showing the value at which a state department’s interest should be valued.160 
Of course, parties approaching a bulk sale need not let it come to a valuation 
of the state department’s interest for purposes of adequate protection. In lieu of 
allowing the issue to go before the court for a valuation, such parties have ways 
of settling disputes of value internally. 
D. How Parties Should Approach a Bulk Sale 
Given the problems that a bulk sale can raise for purchasers, debtors, 
creditors, and sellers alike, parties approaching a bulk sale need to be aware of 
the nuances that such sales entail. A party can operate to best protect its interests 
by coming prepared with a plan of action and being knowledgeable of the 
different approaches each party may take in a bulk sale. This section will explore 
the various avenues each party in a bulk sale can take, including the ways in 
which parties may avoid the problems associated with a bulk sale altogether.  
1. How Purchasers Should Approach a Bulk Sale 
A purchaser in a bulk sale should be wary of the associated risks with 
purchasing a bulk sale asset. Given the ability for state revenue departments to 
assert successor liability against the purchaser, it is imperative for purchasers to 
adhere to the steps required by the state in which the sale is proceeding.161 To 
better prepare for the risks associated with such a purchase, an astute purchaser 
should demand that the seller and debtor are transparent regarding any possible 
back taxes that may be owed. Transparency will provide the purchaser with the 
necessary information to approach the sale in the best way possible to protect 
against liability. This transparency should also extend to the state department 
itself, to keep good faith and superior information allowing for the smoothest 
transaction possible. The front-loading of information will ensure that the 
purchaser is prepared to take one of the many possible steps to avoid successor 
liability. 
 
 159 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 480.  
 160 Id.  
 161 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465 (issuing notice of the purchase to the state department, reserving the 
requisite funds, paying out those funds to the state department). 
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Many jurisdictions have concluded that a bulk sales stop order requires a 
purchaser to not only reserve a portion of the purchase money sufficient to cover 
the outstanding tax liability, but also benefit the state taxing authority.162 These 
courts construe bulk sale provisions to impose essentially strict liability on the 
purchaser for taxes left unpaid by the property’s seller, such that if another 
creditor lays claim to the set-aside funds and the purchaser is compelled to turn 
over the funds to that creditor, the purchaser remains liable to the state for the 
outstanding tax debt.163 One approach a purchaser may take is to set aside the 
requisite funds and file an interpleader action to determine which party, between 
the state department and other creditors, is entitled to that fund. However, should 
the court determine that the other creditors are entitled to that fund (as they 
normally would, given the senior status of those creditors arising from the nature 
of their claim)164 then the purchaser would still be held personally liable to the 
state department for the delinquent taxes.165 Considering the strict interpretation 
that accompanies many bulk sales, a sensible purchaser would look to cover its 
bases before agreeing to a bulk sale. 
One approach a purchaser could take would be to contract tax obligations 
out of the initial purchase agreement. This would involve the purchase contract, 
including a clause that shifts any tax liability that may be placed on a purchaser 
via successor liability doctrines to the seller. This is best accomplished by the 
use of an escrow fund that accompanies the sale itself. For instance, if the sale 
price is $5 million, the purchase money would go into an escrow account, rather 
than going immediately to the seller. The administrator of the escrow account 
would then determine whether any risk of successor liability was apparent. If 
not, the sale could proceed as usual.166 If there was an element of successor 
liability, the sale would be blocked until the seller could provide assurance that 
any outstanding liability had been taken care of. This approach best protects the 
purchaser; however, in the case of a bankruptcy proceeding, a trustee is unlikely 
to sign off on a successor liability shifting clause, especially if the debtor’s assets 
are exceeded by its debts owed to the state department and other creditors. In 
 
 162 Id.; Schnyder v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Red, White & 
Blue Transmission v. Dep’t of Revenue Serv., 690 A.2d 437 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 163 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465; Schnyder, 101 Cal. App. 4th 538; Red, White & Blue Transmission, 
690 A.2d 437.  
 164 It stands to reason that an interest arising from the nonpayment of taxes would occur later in time than 
interests belonging to creditors who help fund a business.  
 165 See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120 / 1 (LexisNexis 2019); See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d at 475; Bjork v. 
United States, 486 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 166 Alan Goldenberg, Acquiring the Assets of a Business? Don’t Forget About Sales Tax, TAX MATTERS, 
(Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.friedmanllp.com/insights/acquiring-the-assets-of-a-business-dont-forget-about-
sales-tax. 
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turn, a trustee is more likely to authorize a bulk sale to a purchaser who is not 
demanding such assurances.  
Despite contracting around outstanding tax obligations in a bulk sale, there 
are some jurisdictions that fail to recognize the agreement of private parties for 
such an arrangement. These jurisdictions maintain a right to seek successor 
liability against the purchaser of a bulk sale, even when the purchase agreement 
specifies that tax liabilities will be borne by the seller. For example, in Reese’s 
Pizza & More v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., a bulk sale was undertaken pursuant 
to a sale agreement that provided “[g]ood and marketable title to the Sale Assets 
shall be sold, assigned, transferred and conveyed to Purchaser by Seller at the 
Closing, free and clear of all claims, liabilities, taxes, liens, security interests, 
encumbrances, restrictions and adverse rights of use or ownership of any kind 
or nature whatsoever.”167 Because of this agreement, the purchaser failed to 
obtain a clearance order pursuant to a Pennsylvania bulk sales provision.168 The 
state department went after the purchaser for the unpaid tax liability, and the 
court ruled in favor of the state writing “we also reject Purchaser’s contention 
that Section 2.3 of the Sale Agreement, wherein Predecessor agreed to transfer 
title to its assets to Purchaser, free and clear of all claims, taxes and liabilities, 
provided Purchaser with a defense to the Department’s assessment against it for 
Predecessor’s unpaid UC taxes.”169 The court went on to suggest that if the 
purchaser wished to insulate itself from the tax liability, it should have obtained 
an order of clearance pursuant to the bulk sale provision.170 The opinion noted 
that the sale agreement may have followed from a misrepresentation of the seller 
in not disclosing unpaid tax obligations.171 Despite this, the court took a hardline 
stance by imposing essentially strict liability, delivering an opinion that carried 
a punitive air about it.172 In a way, the court was punishing the purchaser for 
refusing to adhere to the state bulk sale provision.173 The court added that the 
only remedy remaining for the purchaser was to bring a separate action against 
the seller.174  
 
 167 Reese’s Pizza & More v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 93 A.3d 914, 916 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) 
(Furthermore, the seller misrepresented the asset sale, the opinion suggests that the seller lied about having 
outstanding tax obligations.). 
 168 Id. at 918.  
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. at 919. 
 171 Id. at 918–19.  
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 919. 
 174 Id.  
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In light of the Reese’s Pizza opinion, one may wonder whether the court was 
acting in the interest of the state to a higher degree than was warranted, given 
the specter of misrepresentation that haunted the sales agreement.175 To be sure, 
the court understood that the seller would not have been able to pay the 
outstanding tax liability. This understanding might have placed a thumb on the 
scale in favor of imposing successor liability.176 This is merely one illustration 
of why a purchaser in a bulk sale must be increasingly wary of unscrupulous 
sellers. Furthermore, given some jurisdictions’ unwillingness to give weight to 
a private agreement’s attempt to remove successor liability, the safest way for a 
purchaser to contract out of successor liability is to couple the contract with an 
escrow account that makes sure the sale money will not go through until 
clearance of all tax liabilities is achieved. 
Given the risks a purchaser faces when proceeding with a bulk sale, a 
purchaser’s best bet is to contract out of successor liability before the sale, 
through use of an escrow account; otherwise, the purchaser faces the possibility 
of a state revenue department imposing the successor liability doctrine or 
proceeding to the court for a valuation of the interest created by the bulk sale 
provision. 
2. How Creditors Should Approach a Bulk Sale 
Creditors should also be wary when their debtor starts proceeding with a 
bulk sale. If the state department’s interest is stripped, the creditor needs to 
worry about the state department requesting adequate protection; should the 
adequate protection be granted, the pool of money designated for paying back 
creditors will have one extra swimmer,177 shrinking an often-crowded pool. 
Moreover, the mere presence of a bulk sale provision can be enough to scare off 
potential purchasers who are averse to notions of potential successor liability. 
This has the potential to lower the purchase price in two significant ways. For 
one, the purchaser will likely hold firm in negotiations, requesting to pay a 
smaller amount, resulting in less money available to pay back creditors.  
A second way in which a bulk sale can affect a creditor is by reducing the 
competition in a potential bulk asset purchase. Some experienced purchasers 
may simply avoid a bulk sale purchase if they know that the debtor has 
outstanding tax liabilities. A reduction in competition during the sale will result 
 
 175 Id. at 917. 
 176 Id. at 919.  
 177 This swimmer not only takes up a lot of space but carries authority with it that most other creditors are 
not accustomed to having. 
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in a reduction of the purchase price, further resulting in less value for the estate 
and less money available to pay creditors. Given the foregoing risks, creditors 
should remain alert when the debtor that owes them money is looking to sell off 
assets in a bulk sale. Since creditors have a say in how a reorganization takes 
place, they also have the ability to block plans that may carry more risk, in favor 
of those that keep risk at a minimum. Thus, the creditor should consider different 
approaches when a possible bulk sale is on the table. 
In determining the various approaches to a bulk sale, the distinction between 
senior and junior creditors is important. This Comment will refer to creditors 
that are not the state department as senior creditors. We will operate under the 
assumption that the state department is the junior creditor.178 We know that the 
state department has the ability to go after the successor for delinquent taxes—
a fact that often influences the price of the bulk sale. The senior creditors also 
have a strong power—the ability to force a foreclosure sale. Foreclosure sales 
do not implicate bulk sale provisions for two reasons. First, in a foreclosure sale, 
the assets go to the senior creditors, who then sell off the assets to recover on 
their claims.179 Because the senior creditors have no intention of ever operating 
the asset business, they cannot be considered successors under a bulk sale act.180 
Second, a foreclosure sale is not considered a “sale” at all for purposes of a bulk 
sale act.181 In addition:  
[R]epossession of collateral or a judicial foreclosure is not the type of 
“sale” to which the statute refers when it refers to the “sale of the 
business or stock of assets.” The sale contemplates a willing purchaser 
and willing seller bargaining in the market price over the value of 
goods subsequently exchanged.182  
This is because in a repossession, the creditor already holds an interest in the 
goods and is merely taking back what it essentially owns.183 Given these two 
facts, a foreclosure sale blocks the state department from recovering anything 
under successor liability mechanisms. However, despite the ability of the senior 
creditors to ensure that the state department receives nothing, foreclosure sales 
are not always the best option. This is because foreclosure sales can ultimately 
 
 178 See supra Section II(B) (the reasons why the state department is typically the junior creditor). 
 179 Raymond P. Carpenter, Avoiding Successor Tax Liability in a Sale of Business Assets, 18 ABA J. 49, 
54 (2008). 
 180 Id.  
 181 Id.  
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.  
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reduce recovery when compared with bulk sales that are unencumbered by bulk 
sale interests.184 
Another option a senior creditor may take is the assignment for the benefit 
of creditors or a general assignment.185 This is a common law doctrine occurring 
outside of bankruptcy by which the debtor assigns its title to property to a third 
party.186 The third party then proceeds with the sale and administers the proceeds 
to the creditors.187 Such an assignment is contractual.188 Especially savvy 
creditors may contract for the adoption of such as assignment at the time credit 
is given. The contract could provide that any bulk sale proceeds via a general 
assignment rather than through traditional bankruptcy law. At the very least, the 
contract could provide for a third party whose actions would predictably be in 
line with the contracting creditor’s wishes. Given that the third party would 
control the administration of the bulk sale proceeds, the contracting creditor 
would not have to worry about the proceeds coming into conflict with any right 
the state department may have to request adequate protection. Potential pitfalls 
of this approach stem from the fact that there will likely be numerous creditors, 
and thus it is hard to draft a contract that will consider the presence of other 
creditors whose claims may arise far later. An effective contract may merely 
require that the contracting creditor receive the full amount of the money it is 
owed from the proceeds of any bulk sale, to be administered by a third-party 
trustee of the contracting creditor’s choosing.189 This approach involves plenty 
of foresight and may be unattractive to creditors who have strong faith in typical 
bankruptcy procedures.  
Alternatively, a state department would not have the same ability to contract 
for an assignment for the benefit of creditors, because the state department’s 
right to tax payment does not stem from an agreement to give credit, but rather 
from a failure to comply with state statutes. The absence of a contract between 
the state department and the debtor results in the inability for the state 
department to pursue such an approach. 
Considering that senior creditors and state departments have the most skin 
in the game in a bulk sale, the approach that best represents each sides’ interest 
 
 184 Ill. Dep’t. of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465, 479 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 185 Bob Eisenbach, Assignments For The Benefit Of Creditors: Simple As ABC?, IN THE (RED) THE BUS. 
BANKR. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2008), https://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2008/03/articles/business-bankruptcy-
issues/assignments-for-the-benefit-of-creditors-simple-as-abc/. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id.  
 188 Id.  
       189    Id.  
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is compromise. Of course, this would involve the realization by each party that 
the sale is unlikely to result in a realization of the full value of its claim. Once 
this is established, however, clever parties would do well to seek out their 
opposition and negotiate a settlement, rather than allowing the court to proceed 
in valuing all interests. Part of the impetus behind compromise stems from the 
fact that courts are unpredictable in how they approach interests under bulk sale 
provisions.  
A state department approaching a possible compromise would be wise to 
determine the value of consideration stemming from removal of its interest. 
Because there is a good possibility that the value of consideration is the extent 
that the court will be willing to protect the state department’s interest pursuant 
to § 363(e), a state department should be equipped with this information when 
it approaches settlement. However, it warrants asking whether a state department 
equipped with such information is better off just going to court and asking for 
adequate protection. Given that it has the value of its interest in mind, such a 
request for adequate protection is less likely to fall victim to the same valuation 
problem present in Hanmi.190  
It would make the most sense for the trustee to negotiate with the state 
department on behalf of a debtor’s senior creditors. Given there are typically 
multiple senior creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, a single entity that can 
speak to the best interests of all involved would make a settlement far more 
efficient. Allowing the trustee to negotiate with the state department to remove 
the state department’s interest would benefit the senior creditors in two ways. 
First, it would avoid the potential that a court overvalues a state department’s 
interest or gives the state department’s interest too high of a priority. By settling, 
the trustee can ensure that the senior creditor’s interests are at least represented, 
rather than being completely decided by the court. Second, settlement is far 
cheaper than litigation and would allow the creditors to not waste valuable funds 
in facing off against the state department in court. Given these considerations, 
allowing the trustee to negotiate with the state department on behalf of the senior 
creditors allows for predictability and saves money. 
3. How Sellers Should Approach a Bulk Sale 
The seller is the party with the least to lose in a bulk sale. Given that the bulk 
sale provisions attach successor liability to the purchaser, the seller has a 
relatively easy way of getting off the hook for unpaid taxes, and oftentimes uses 
 
 190 See Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465.  
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the bulk sale itself as a way of relieving its unpaid tax obligations. Additionally, 
if the seller is a debtor in a bankruptcy case, it may be the case that it is not the 
one conducting the sale. In situations such as those, the seller need not worry 
much about conducting the bulk sale. Despite this, there are still some concerns 
that sellers must be aware of when initiating a bulk sale.  
Arguably the worst mistake a seller could make in a bulk sale is fraud. If the 
seller misrepresents the sale, perhaps by contending it do not owe any unpaid 
taxes, the seller runs the risk of the sale being voided, and even further, of being 
assessed punitive damages.191  
Absent avoiding fraud, the seller’s primary obligation in a bulk sale is to 
negotiate for the highest purchase price (provided the trustee has not taken on 
that responsibility). If the assets are encumbered by obligations such as unpaid 
taxes, the purchase price will likely be negotiated to a lower amount. Of course, 
the best way for a seller to achieve a favorable purchase price is to make the sale 
known to the public. The more bidders vying for the assets, the higher the 
purchase price will be driven.  
Ultimately, a seller ought to comply with all relevant statutes, both state and 
federal, and conduct the sale with profit maximization in mind.  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, courts assessing bulk sale provisions in a bankruptcy 
proceeding would do well to follow the dicta provided in Hanmi. That is, courts 
should only provide adequate protection of a bulk sale interest commensurate to 
the amount that the state department can show its interest declined in value. This 
approach encourages communication and settlement to help ensure that the 
desires of all parties are represented. Furthermore, parties approaching a bulk 
sale in a bankruptcy proceeding should maintain transparency and pursue 
compromise in order to avoid unpredictable court decisions and costly litigation.  
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